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CASENOTE
Boarhead Corporation v. Erickson:
CERCLA Precludes the Use of Other Statutes
to Challenge EPA Cleanup Actions
INTRODUCTION
A farm in eastern Pennsylvania became the focal point for a legal
battle involving two federal statutes and the cleanup of toxic wastes. In
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson1 , the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the
Third Circuit) interpreted the conflicting requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) 2 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (Preservation Act).3
CERCLA was hastily enacted in the waning days of the Carter
Administration to govern the cleanup of sites containing hazardous substances. Under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA)
places sites containing hazardous substances on the National Priorities
List (the Superfund List) after interested parties 4 are provided appropriate
notice and a comment period. Owners of designated sites may be financially responsible
for the costs incurred in removing the hazardous sub5
stances.
The haste with which CERCLA was drafted and passed resulted
in conflicts between it and other statutes. In 1986 Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) to extend the
life of CERCLA, clarify its meaning, and increase the effectiveness of the
earlier legislation.6 In Boarhead, the EPA contended that in enacting SARA,
Congress intended to preclude all judicial review of challenges to EPA
plans to remove or remediate toxic wastes until after the removal or remediation actions were completed.
1. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 (1988).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§470-470w-6 (1988).
4. The term 'interested party' is not defined in CERCLA, At a minimum, a court should
apply a test for standing to determine if a party has sufficient 'interest' to be given notice and
afforded an opportunity to comment about placing a property on the Superfund List.
5. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a).
6. L. Peck, Note, Viable ProtectionMechanismsfor Lenders Against Hazardous Waste Liability,
18 Hofstra L. Rev. 89,95 (1989).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

The Preservation Act is intended to protect the cultural and historical resources of the nation. 7 State historic preservation agencies are
responsible for surveying and nominating properties for inclusion on the
National Register of Historic Places under criteria established by the
Department of Interior. Federal agencies are required to take into account
the effect their actions may have on property listed or eligible to be listed
on the National Register. 8 The Boarhead plaintiff argued that judicial
review of proposed cleanup actions was available under the Preservation
Act to determine if the EPA complied with that act in fulfilling its mandate
under CERCLA.
This note examines whether the Third Circuit correctly interpreted CERCLA's legislative history when it ruled that Congress intended
to preclude judicial review of challenges to EPA plans to remove or remediate toxic wastes until after the removal or remediation actions were
completed. The Third Circuit concluded that Congress intended to prevent such challenges, including those brought under other statutes, even
the Preservation Act, unless the challenges met the requirements of one of
five exceptions set forth in CERCLA.
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
Congress enacted CERLCA in 1980 to address the cleanup of
improperly managed hazardous waste sites. 9 CERCLA imposed liability
for cleanups on four classes of persons or enterprises:
1) the owners or operators of the waste site at the time of the
cleanup;
2) the owners or operators of the site at the time of the disposal of
the waste;
3) the generators of the waste who arranged for it to be disposed
of at the site; and,
4) those who transported the waste to the site for disposal. 10
The statute established a trust fund, known as the Superfund, to
provide the money to deal with the health threats posed by the waste
sites.11 General revenues and a tax on petrochemicals provided the financ12
ing for the Superfund.
7. 16 U.S.C. §470(b).
8. 16 U.S.C. §470f.
9. M. Conyngham, Comment, Robbing the CorporateGrave:CERCLA Liability, Rule 17(b), and
Post-DissolutionCapacity to be Sued, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 855,857 (1990) [hereinafter Robbing the CorporateGrave].
10. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1982).
11. Robbing the CorporateGrave, supra note 9, at 857.
12. 26 U.S.C. §§4611-4682 (1982).
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CERCLA was enacted in December 1980 during the closing days
of a lame-duck Congressional session. 13 For the previous three years, Congress had not been able to pass legislation to deal with the problem of hazardous waste sites. 14 In passing CERCLA, Congress recognized that if it
did not act before the end of that session, hazardous15 waste legislation
might not become law under the new administration.
The bill enacted has virtually no legislative history.16 "The final
version of the bill ...was a compromise worked out by an ad hoc bi-partisan group of Senators." 17 The compromise bill was substituted on the
floor as an amendment of a bill18reported by the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
The amendment was introduced by Sen. Stafford (R-Vt.) and was
managed on the floor by Sen. Randolph (D-W.Va.), chairman of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works. 19 Randolph described the
compromise bill as being less far-reaching than the bill originally reported
by the committee he chaired, but he said that supporters of the legislation
had to settle for less in order to pass a bill to deal with the hazardous waste
problem. 20 CERCLA, as adopted by the Senate,
established a $1.6 billion
21
Superfund to be expended over five years.
After the Senate approved the bill, the legislation was treated as if
it origimated in the House because CERCLA was in part a revenue measure.2 To accomplish this, the Senate took up for consideration a hazardous waste bill previously passed by the House. 23 The Senate amended the
House bill, substituting
its own bill for the House version and passed the
24
bill on a voice vote.
The House considered the Senate's version of the CERCLA legislation under a suspension of the rules, 25 which meant no amendments
13. F. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
A Legislative History of CERCLA]
14. A. Anderson, Note, CorporateLife after Death, CERCLA Preemption ofState CorporateDissolution Law, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 131,137 (1989) [hereinafter CERCLA Preemption].
15. Id. at 145 & n. 72 (quoting the statements of Sen. Mitchell and Rep. Florio as reported
in 126 Cong. Rec. 30,941 and 31,968-69 (1980)).
16. A Legislative History of CERCLA, supra note 13, at 1.
17. CERCLA Preemption,supra note 14, at 145 & n. 73.
18. A Legislative History of CERCLA, supra note 13, at 20-21.
19. Id. at 21. ,
20. 126 Cong. Rec. 30,930-31 and 30,936. Sen. Randolph apparently did not feel enough
votes could be secured to pass the legislation in the form originally recommended by the
committee he chaired.
21. A Legislative Historyof CERCLA, supra note 13, at 22. Initially, the Superfund was to be
$4.1 billion, to be spent over six years. Apparently as part of the compromise that resulted in
the passage of CERCLA, the Senate leadership agreed to an amendment by Sen. Helms
reducing the fund. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 29.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 29-30.
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were permitted and debate was limited. 26 Rep. Florio (D-N.J.), the floor
leader for the bill in the House, used much of his allotted time to reassure
supporters of the earlier House legislation that, despite the lack of input
by House members in the final version of the legislation, "everything
would be fine." 2 7 Rep. Broyhill (R-N.C.), floor leader of the opposition,
criticized the process by which the compromise bill was arrived at, drawing attention to numerous flaws in the bill.28 The House
passed the bill by
29
a vote of 274 in favor, 94 against, and 64 not voting.
As the product of a last-minute compromise, CERCLA not only
lacked a legislative history to aid in its interpretation, it was poorly
drafted. The bill was described by one court as "hardly a model of concise
legislative draftsmanship." 30 Another court said that Congress had once
again placed the courts in "the undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." 3 1 In part, the problems with
interpreting CERCLA led to its amendment in 1986.
THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986
The process of enacting the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) took three years, beginning with President
Reagan's 1984 State of the Union message. 32 In that speech, President
Reagan said the administration would develop a proposal for extending
the life of CERCLA. 33 After that announcement, however, the administration took no further action in 1984, and, while some members of Congress
viewed the reauthorization of CERCLA as 34
a useful election-year issue, a
final bill did not make it through Congress.
The Reagan Administration introduced its proposal to amend
CERCLA in February 1985, calling for replenishing the Superfund with
$5.3 billion dollars, to be spent over a five-year period.35 The review of

CERCLA was extensive. During the course of review, the EPA made pre-

26. Id. at 31.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 30, 34.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 FSupp. 1269, 1277 (D.Del. 1987), aff'd.,
851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
31. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F.Supp. 823,838-39
n. 15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
32. T.Atkeson et al., An Annotated Legislative Historyof the Superfund Amendments and ReauthorizationAct of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,360,10,366-67 (Dec. 1986)
[hereinafter An Annotated Legislative Historyof SARA].
33. Id. at 10,367.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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sentations
to seven congressional committees, each of which filed a
36
report.
The Senate and House versions of the CERCLA amendments

were significantly different, and the Conference Committee began the
work of reconciling them in February 1986. 3 The committee was chaired
by Sen. Stafford (R-Vt.), chairman of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee and Rep. Dingell (D-Mich.), chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee. 38 The Conference Committee filed its
report and both houses passed the revised legislation in October 1986. 39

The bill faced the danger of a veto by President Reagan, who
objected to the excise tax imposed by SARA to replenish the CERCLA

Superfund. 40 The veto threat was limited by the large margins with which
the Senate and the House passed the bill. The Senate passed the bill by a
vote of 88-8 and the House by 386-27,41 margins sufficient to override a
presidential veto. To avoid a pocket veto, Congress threatened to stay in

to
session for two additional weeks, despite the desire of many members
42
adjourn so they could turn their attention to re-election campaigns.
A coalition of congressional members and representatives of

industry and environmental groups lobbied the President to sign the
bill.43 Several Republican members warned the President a veto would
harm their re-election campaigns. 44 In addition, a group of 50 senators, led
by Senate Majority Leader Dole (R-Kan.) and Sen. Stafford, gave the President a written commitment that the group would support a veto of any

future Congressional attempt to enact a general purpose broad-based tax
or to increase the amount of the special tax in SARA to fund CERCLAmandated cleanups. 4 5 President Reagan46signed SARA on October 17,
1986, without the usual signing ceremony.
36: Id. at n. 62. See also 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835. The House Ways and Means Committee
actually issued two reports. One accompanied the bill as originally passed by the House. This
bill carried the number of the bill that was finally enacted after substantial changes by the
Senate. A second report accompanied an early version of H.R. 2005. In addition, the House
Science and Technology Committee issued a report on H.R. 3065, another proposal to amend
CERCLA.
37. An Annotated Legislative History of SARA, supranote 32, at 10,368.
38. Id. at 10,369.
39. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1986), reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec.
H9032 (daily ed. Oct. 3,1986) (Conference Report on H.R. 2005, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986), also reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276 [hereinafter Conference
Report]. The Senate passed the Committee's version of the bill on Oct. 3, 1986, followed by
the House on Oct. 8, 1986. See 132 Cong. Rec. S14,943 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) and 132 Cong.
Rec. H9634 (daily ed. Oct. 8,1986).
40. An Annotated Legislative History of SARA, supra note 32, at 10369-70.
41. 132 Cong. Rec. S14,943 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986); 132 Cong. Rec. H9634 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1986).
42. An Annotated LegislativeHistory of SARA, supra note 32, at 10,370.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10367, 10370.
46. Id. at 10,367.
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SARA replenished the Superfund with $8.5 billion,47 established
mandatory cleanup standards, 4 8 created guidelines for settlements with
potentially responsible parties 49 and guidelines for public participation in
the selection of the method to be used to clean up a Superfund site,5 0 and
ordered the cleanup of toxic wastes on federal facilities. 5 1 In addition,
SARA added a section to CERCLA prohibiting judicial review of challenges to removal or remedial actions selected by the EPA to clean up a
Superfund site. 52 This was the section at issue in BoarheadCorp.v. Erickson.
THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT OF 1966
Congress enacted the Preservation Act in 1966 to preserve "the
historical and cultural foundations of our Nation as a living part of community life and development to give a sense of orientation to the American people." 5 3 The Preservation Act is the basis for most of the
"administrative apparatus, protective devices and financial incentives
employed by the federal government to carry out the national historic
preservation policy."54 Earlier legislation designed to foster preservation
directed federal efforts towards the preservation of historical and archeological sites for public use, usually through public ownership. 55 The 1966
Act expanded the scope of federal efforts to include 'cultural' resources
and a commitment to stimulate and assist the preservation of properties in
56
non-federal ownership.
Four elements of the Preservation Act are the heart of federal preservation programs. 5 7 First, the National Register of Historic Places is an
inventory of "districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant
58
in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture."
Under criteria established by the Secretary
of Interior, state officials nomi59
nate properties for listing in the Register.
Second, federal funds for preservation are channeled either as
matching grants-in-aid to the states or the National Trust for Historic Pres47. 42 U.S.C. §9611(a).
48.
49.
50.
51.

42 U.S.C. §9621.
Id. §9622.
Id. §9617.
Id. §9620; 10 U.S.C. §§2701-2707 and 2810 (1988).

52. 42 U.S.C. §9613(h).
53. 16 U.S.C. §470(b)(2).
54. J. Fowler, HistoricPreservationand the Law Today, 12 Urb. Law. 3, 7 (1980).

55. J. Fowler, Federal HistoricPreservation Law: NationalHistoric PreservationAct, Executive
Order 11593, and Other Recent Developments in Federal Law, 12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31,40 (1976)
[hereinafter Federal Historic Preservation Law].
56. Id.
57. Fowler, supranote 54, at 7.

58. 16 U.S.C. §470a(a) (1988).
59. Id.
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ervation, or as direct grants for the preservation of properties listed on the
National Register.60 The federal monies help fund state preservation programs and surveys, pay for restoration of publicly and privately owned
properties listed on the National Register, train skilled labor in preservation techniques, and assist6 private individuals and small businesses to
remain in historic districts. '
Third, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation advises the
President and Congress on matters relating to historic preservation, recommends measures to coordinate the preservation-related activities of
public and private entities, and provides advice on the dissemination of
information related to such activities. 62 The Council is composed of representatives of the federal government, the states and cities, experts in the
63
field of preservation, and the general public.
The fourth major element of the Preservation Act is Section 106.
This is the section of the Act that was at issue in Boarhead. The clash
occurred because the EPA said that §113 of CERCLA, which denies the
district courts jurisdiction to hear challenges to Superfund cleanup or precleanup activities, barred challenges brought under other statutes such as
the Preservation Act.64 The Boarheadplaintiff insisted that §106 of the Preservation Act did apply to CERCLA-mandated cleanups and the proposed
cleanup had to conform to that section's requirements before the EPA
could proceed. 65
Section 106 establishes a mandatory review program to ensure
that federally administered, funded or licensed programs conforn to the
requirements of the Preservation Act. 66 The section directs all federal
agencies with jurisdiction over a federal or federally assisted undertaking,
or any federal agency with licensing authority over any undertaking, to
take into account the effect of the undertaking on any property listed on
the National Register before approving the expenditure of any federal
67
funds or the issuance of any license.
Under the review process, federal agencies are guided by historic
preservation experts in planning agency activities to minimize damage to
historic properties. Agencies are to provide the Advisory Council a reasonable opportunity to comment on such undertakings. 68 Federal agencies have interpreted Section 106 to cover a wide variety of administrative
actions, including: grants for highway and urban renewal projects;
60. Id. §470a(d).
61. Id.

62. Id. §470j.
63. Id. §470i.
64. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1015 n. 9 (and accompanying text), 1018.

65. Id.
66. FederalHistoric PreservationLaw, supranote 55, at 41.
67. 16 U.S.C. 9470f

68. Id.
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approval of urban renewal plans; transfers of surplus federal buildings;
alterations of federal buildings; permits for bridges, levees, power lines
and plants, construction of coastal improvements, granting rights-of-way
over federal lands; condemnation69of land for a national forest; and
approval of federal loan guarantees.
Where a federal agency maintains discretionary control over an
action, the agency can require changes to the action to fulfill recommendations of the Advisory Council. 70 However, where a federal7 1agency acts
solely in a ministerial capacity, Section 106 is not applicable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Boarhead arose when the owner of a farm, which potentially was
eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places, filed suit
under the Preservation Act to enjoin the EPA from taking any actions

affecting the farm and to request that the farm be removed from the Superfund list. In addition, the owner sought damages for the EPA's infringement on the right to quiet enjoyment of its property and to recover
attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that Congress, in enacting CERCLA, removed from the district courts jurisdiction over all challenges to the EPA's cleanup activities of Superfund sites, except for five
exceptions enumerated in §113(h) of CERCLA. 72 The court found that the
69. Federal Historic Preservation Law, supra note 55, at 50.
70. Id. at 52-53.
71. Id.at 51-52,53 n. 84.
72. Boarhead,923 F.2d at 1019. Section 1139(h) reads:
"No federal court shall have the jurisdiction under Federal law other than section 1332 of
Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards)
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this
title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one
of the following:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or damages or for contribution.
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of this title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order.
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this title.
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) [Parenthetical in original] alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or
secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter.
Such an action may not be brought where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site.
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the United States has moved to compel
a remedial action."
42 U.S.C. §9613(h).
The only opportunities for judicial review not covered by §113(h) are found in §121(0(2)
and (3), which permit a state to challenge an abatement action secured under §106 or a remedial action on a federally owned or operated facility, where such actions will not conform to
the cleanup standards established in §121. See 42 U.S.C. §121(f)(2) and (3) and 132 Cong. Rec.
H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8,1986).
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plaintiff's complaint did not meet any of the exceptions. 73 Thus, the congressional prohibition of judicial review extended to causes of action that
arose under other statutes, including the Preservation Act and the Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter the APA). 74

BACKGROUND
Boarhead Corp. owns a 118-acre farm in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, near the Delaware Canal, in an area that contains many historic and
archeological sites. The farm includes a late eighteenth century farmhouse, is traversed by stone field walls and might have historic remains.
The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission determined that
75
the farmhouse was eligible for the National Register of Historic Places.
The Commission also believed the farm might contain significant historic
and prehistoric archeological resources. The farm is adjacent to state
gamelands, and, in recent history, most of the acreage has been used as
gamelands. In addition, two large automobile graveyards are partially
contiguous with the farm. The developed portion of the Boarhead land
includes a horse farm. Unfortunately for the owners, the property also
includes a service and repair shop for construction and transport vehi76
cles.
From the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, Boarhead used the
shop to repair trucks that hauled chemicals for companies 'involved' with
its president. 77 At times, the chemical transport trucks were parked overnight at the farm. During the 1970s, three or four serious chemical spills
from those trucks occurred on the farm. Boarhead did not deny the existence of those spills. The EPA also claimed that wastes were brought to the
site and buried, apparently in drums. The source of this information was
not disclosed. 78
On March 31, 1989, the EPA designated the farm a Superfund site
because there was a significant risk of the release of hazardous substances.
The designation was made after appropriate notice to interested parties
and a comment period. On May 18,1989, the EPA notified Boarhead Corp.
that the agency intended to conduct studies to determine the extent of the
problem. The EPA told Boarhead that it considered the company poten73. Boarhead, 923 F2d at 1019.
74. Id. at 1024.

75. Brief for Amici Curiae National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States and
the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission at 10-11, Boarhead, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d
Cir. 1990) (No.90-1040).
76. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Boarhead, 923 E2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1040).
77. Id. at 8. (The Appellant's brief uses the word "involved" to describe the relationship
between Boarhead's president and the companies. The brief does not explain what
"involved" means.)
78. Id.
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tially responsible for the site contamination. Depending on the outcome of
the studies, the EPA said it might undertake remedial action.
In reply, Boarhead told the EPA that the farm was eligible for listing as an historic place and asked whether the EPA had conducted a
review of the site as required under the Preservation Act. 79 On July 10,
1989, before it received the EPA's reply, Boarhead filed suit in United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the
Preservation Act.80 The suit requested that the District Court remove the
farm from the Superfund List and enjoin any EPA activities that might
affect the farm. The complaint alleged that the EPA failed to conduct the
review required by §106 of the Preservation Act and regulations implementing to the Act. In a letter dated September 19, 1989, the EPA replied to
Boarhead's earlier letter. The reply said that while the EPA had not conducted a formal §106 review, appropriate historic preservation issues
would be considered under procedures established pursuant to CER1
CLA.

8

On December 15, 1989, the District Court granted the EPA's
motion to dismiss Boarhead's suit, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. The
District Court said that under CERCLA only the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit could remove the farm from the Superfund
list or grant damages for the farm having been listed. In addition, the
court held that under CERCLA federal courts could not review removal or
remedial actions until either an enforcement or cost-recovery action was
commenced or a removal or remedial action was completed. 82 The court
refused to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit because the statutory deadline for filing a challenge to a
Superfund listing passed before Boarhead filed the suit.8 3 Boarhead
appealed the District Court's ruling to the Third Circuit.

LEGAL ISSUES
A central issue in Boarheadwas whether the actions of the EPA, in
carrying out the requirements of CERCLA, may be challenged under
79. Boarhead,923 E2d at 1014.
80. 726 FSupp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
81. Boarhead,923 F2d at 1014. The letter further requested that Boarhead provide the EPA
with any information supporting the contention that the farm was eligible for listing on the
National Register. The EPA sent similar letters to the Pennsylvania Historic Preservation
Officer and to the Executive Director of the Bucks County Historical Society Id. at 1014 n. 6.
82. 726 F.Supp. at 611.
83. Id. at 612.42 U.S.C. §9613(a) provides that any regulation promulgated under CERCLA
may be reviewed when an interested person applies to the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals within 90 days of promulgation of the regulation. The listing of a site on the
National Priorities List (or Superfund List) is considered promulgation of a regulation. 726 F
Supp. at 610. (The term 'interested party' is not defined. At a minimum, a court presumably
would apply a test for standing to determine if a party could challenge a regulation.)
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other federal statutes for failure to meet the requirements of those other
statutes. Boarhead Corp. contended that the EPA was required to comply
with §106 of the Preservation Act84 before conducting pre-cleanup activities under CERCLA. 85 Section 106 requires that federal agencies consult
with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and state historic
preservation officers to "consider alternate approaches to problems in
frustrating the
order to minimize the damage to historic property without
86
agencies in fulfilling their obligations under federal law."
Jurisdiction Under the Preservation Act
Federal courts of appeal generally have recognized that the Preservation Act provides federal-question jurisdiction and a private right of
action. 87 Relying on the decisions of the Third Circuit and other courts of
appeal, the Boarhead court found no barrier to federal jurisdiction.88 The
Third Circuit also noted that the Preservation Act allows private parties to
recover attorneys' fees in a civil action brought to enforce the Act and concluded that Congress must have intended to provide such a private right
of action.89
The Private Right of Action Is Preempted
Recognizing that the Preservation Act generally provides for judicial review of federal agency actions that affect historic properties, the
Third Circuit then reviewed CERCLA to decide if CERCLA permitted
judicial review of EPA actions taken under the statute. The court found
that §113(h) creates a general prohibition on judicial review of challenges
84. 16 U.S.C. §470f.
85. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1012-13. In addition to the challenge brought under the Preservation Act, Boarhead argued that the EPA's alleged violations of the Preservation Act were subject to review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. §§701-706. Id. at 102324. Section 702 of the APA provides that a party "suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. §702, Agency action includes the failure of an agency to act. Id. Because the reasoning the Court applied to disposing of the challenge brought under the Preservation Act applies to a challenge brought under the APA, that
claim will not be dealt with separately.
86. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1015. On appeal, the parties agreed that the District Court was correct in finding that §113(a) of CERCLA provided that only the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia could review the farm's listing as a Superfund site. Because Boarhead did not make a timely or proper application for removal of the case to that court, that
issue was not heard on the appeal. Id. at 1015-16.
87. Id. at 1017-18.
88. id. at 1017 (citing Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271
(3d Cir. 1983); Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 E2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents & Assocs. v. Brown, 875 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.denied 493 U.S. 1020 (1990)
[hereinafter Vieux Carrel; National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 635 F.2d 324 (4th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam); WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979)).
89. 923 F.2d at 1017 (citing Vieux Carre, 875 F.2d at 458); Bywater Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Tricarico, 879 F.2d 165,167 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (citing Vieux Carre,
875 F.2d 453).
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to removal or remedial actions selected under §104 of CERCLA or to
90
abatement actions under §106(a) and allowed only five exceptions.
According to the Third Circuit, the plaintiff did not satisfy any of the
exceptions. 9 1

The court specifically reviewed the citizen's complaint exception
in §113(h) and found the plaintiff's claim failed to meet the requirements
for a citizen's suit.92 A citizen's suit may by brought by persons acting on

their own behalf against any party, including the federal government,
alleged to be violating CERCLA or the regulations carrying out the purposes of the act.93 A citizen's suit may also be brought when the federal

government allegedly fails to carry out a nondiscretionary duty under the
act.94 The court found that Boarhead neither made the allegations essential for a citizen's suit nor gave the 60 day notice required to bring such a
suit. 95 The complaint did not charge that the EPA violated the require-

ments of the statute or the CERCLA regulations or that a government official failed to carry out a nondiscretionary duty required by CERCLA.9 6
The court reviewed both legislative intent and the plain language
of the statute to decide if Congress intended to preclude judicial review in
all but the five exceptions provided. The Third Circuit held that the language "[n]o federal court shall have jurisdiction under federal law. .. "
could not have been a clearer statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.97 The Court concluded that Congress in enacting

CERCLA intended to provide the EPA with the authority and funds to
respond expeditiously to serious hazards without judicial challenges
delaying or stopping the work prior to or during a cleanup. 98 Under the
90. 923 F.2d at 1013-14. The five exceptions are listed supra note 72.
91. Id. at 1019. The court did not explicitly address the exceptions other than that for 'citizens suits,' which is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 92-96. The nature of
Boarheadclearly shows why the case did not fit the remaining exceptions. The first exception
permits judicial review of an action under §9607 to recover costs or damages or to seek a contribution from a responsible party to repay costs incurred in a cleanup. No such costs had
been incurred when this case was brought. The second exception permits review of an order
issued by the EPA under §9606(a), directing a person to abate an actual or threatened release
of a hazardous substance or seeking to collect a penalty for violation of such an order. No
such order had been issued when this case was brought, The third exception permits a party
ordered to undertake an abatement action to recover the costs of the abatement where the
party can prove that it should not be liable for the abatement or where the party can prove
that the abatement ordered was arbitrary or capricious or excessive in cost. Boarhead did not
bring suit to recover the costs for an abatement under this exception. The fourth exception
permits a 'citizens suit' to challenge whether a removal or remedial action under §§9604 or
9606 was a violation of any of the requirements of CERCLA. As noted, this exception is
reviewed in the text below. The final exception permits a party compelled to take a remedial
action under §9606 to challenge that action.
92. Id. at 1019 n. 13.
93. 42 U.S.C. §9659(a)(1).
94. Id. §9659(a)(2).
95. Boarhead,923 F.2d at 1019 n. 13.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1020.
98, Id. at 1019.
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measures and responcongressional plan, disputes about proper cleanup
99
sibilities are to be dealt with after the cleanup.
In determining that judicial review was precluded under §113(a),
the Third Circuit looked to its own precedent. However, in the Third Circuit cases, the challenges to the EPA action were brought under CERCLA,
not another statute. 1l' Because those cases did not involve challenges to
cleanup actions based on a claim brought under another statute, the cases
did not provide clear precedent for this case. 10 1 The Third Circuit recognized this, saying that the Boarheaddecision was more difficult because the
complaint was "based on the Preservation Act, not CERCLA, and irreparable harm could occur if subject matter jurisdiction were denied until the
EPA completed its cleanup activities.... " 10 2 Nevertheless, the court found
that the plain language of CERCLA precluded judicial review and the
granting of equitable relief. 10 3 The fact that Boarhead's claim was brought
under another statute was not sufficient to defeat the court's interpretation of CERCLA.
The Third Circuit suggested that any relief to be granted in this
area would have to come from Congress. 104 However, the court did leave
open the possibility of an additional means of judicial review. In a footnote, the court pointed out that the EPA did not deny that its actions under
CERCLA are bound by the terms of the Preservation Act and even
acknowledged that the EPA's own regulations required the agency to considerrpreservation factors in planning activities conducted under CER5
CLA.MU
The Third Circuit said "the EPA would be well advised to follow
its own regulations" in planning the cleanup. 10 6 The court left unanswered the "troubling questions" of whether judicial review would be
available if the plaintiff could show that the EPA did not follow its own
107
regulations or whether the plaintiff would have standing in such a case.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Third Circuit decision did not set forth in detail the legislative
history that led the court to determine that Congress clearly intended
99. Id.

100. Id. at 1021-22.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1022-23.
104. Id,at 1021.
105. Id. at 1022 n. 17.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court did not describe what it considered troubling about the availability of
judicial review if the EPA did not adhere to its own regulations or the standing of Boarhead
to bring a suit requesting such review. Presumably the court was concerned that §113(h) may
effectively prohibit review of a failure by the EPA to follow regulations not mandated by
CERCLA itself.
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CERCLA to override the requirements of other federal legislation. The
§113(h) language cited by the Third Circuit was added to CERCLA as part
of SARA.' A review of SARA's legislative history supports the EPA's
position. However, conflict between the provisions of CERCLA and other
legislation was not specifically mentioned in committee reports and
debates on SARA. Therefore, support for the view that CERCLA preempts
the requirements of other statutes is implied from the language of the act
and legislative, history and is not derived from a clear expression in the
history that Congress intended CERCLA to preempt other statutes.
The Conference Report 0 9
The Conference Report on SARA does not explicitly state that
§113(h) was meant to override any right to judicial review of CERCLAmandated cleanups brought under other statutes. 110 However, the Conference Report states that the proposed Senate amendments to CERCLA
provided for "judicial review of the response under only three circumstances."'111 The House version of the amendments included three exceptions identical to those proposed by the Senate, plus five others. 112 In the
final version of §113(h), the Conference Committee substitute adopted the
three exceptions common to both bills, the fourth exception proposed by
the House, and a modified version of the fifth House exception in the final
version of §113(h). 113 The Conference Report said that the new section "is
not intended to affect in any way the rights of persons to bring nuisance
actions under State law with respect to releases or threatened
releases of
114
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants."
The strong implication of the language in the Conference Report
is that there is to be no judicial review of CERCLA cleanups or the actions
leading up to them, except as provided in the five exceptions under
§113(h), unless the suit is based in nuisance law and is intended to prevent
further releases of hazardous materials. A suit based on a right of action
conferred in another statute is not one of the recognized exceptions, and,
108. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
109. A conference report is generally one of the last steps in passage of a bill by Congress.
After each house passes its version of the proposed statute, a conference committee, composed of members of each house, meets to iron out the differences between the two versions.
When a conference committee completes its work, the revised bill is returned to each house
for final passage. The bill is accompanied by a conference report that explains the various sections of the legislation and the reasons for the changes the committee made to the orginal versions passed by each house. Floor amendments are usually not permitted to a bill
recommended by a conference committee. A conference report carries additional weight in
the interpretation of legislation as it represents the opinion of the senators and representatives who created the final version of a bill.
110. Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9032, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276.
111. Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9095, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3314
(emphasis added).
112. Conference Report, supranote 39, at H9095, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3315.
113. Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9095, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3316-17.
114. Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9096, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3317.
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therefore, is not permitted. A review of the Senate and House committee
reports on the legislation that eventually became SARA and the floor commentary on the legislation supports this interpretation.
Legislative History in the Senate
The Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works
report on the proposed CERCLA amendments favorably cited the lower
court decision in Lone Pine Steering Committee v. United States E.PA., 115 saying that the case correctly interpreted CERCLA in holding that both the
language and the legislative history of CERCLA indicated that Congress
did not intend to allow pre-enforcement judicial review of CERCLA
actions. 116 The Committee believed that "the scheme and purpose of CERCLA would be disrupted by affording judicial review of orders or
response actions prior
to commencement of a government enforcement or
" 17
recovery action. 1
The Senate Committee said that the purpose of the proposed
amendments to CERCLA was to "expressly recognize that pre-enforcement review would be a significant obstacle to the implementation of
response actions and the use of administrative orders." 118 Pre-enforcement review would result in considerable delay in carrying out cleanups,
increase response costs, and discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups.119 After completion of a response action, judicial review was limited
to review of the administrative record.1 20 The intent of limiting judicial
review was to expedite the process of review and ensure that the court
121
focused on the information and criteria used to select the response.
Agency decisions were to
be overturned only if the action chosen was
122
arbitrary and capricious.
In Lone Pine Steering Committee v. U.S. Environmental Protection
123
Agency,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the language of
the original §9604 in CERCLA contained an implicit disapproval of preenforcement judicial review. 12 4 The court also noted that the CERCLA's
legislative history indicated that it was preferable to err on the side of pro115. 600 ESupp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1985).
116. S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 58 (1985) (Senate Report of the Committee on the
Environmentand Public Works on the Superfund Improvement Act of 1985) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
11, 99th Cong.]. This bill was the predecessor to the final 1986 act. The committee report was
issued prior to Lone Pine Steering Committee v. U.S. E.P.A., 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986), which upheld the lower court decision.
117. S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong. at 58.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 57.
121. Id.

122.
123.
(D.N.J.
124.

Id.
777 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1985). This case was the appellate review of 600 F.Supp. 1487
1985), supra note 115.
Id. at 886-87.
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tecting public health and the environment in administering the Superfund
because delays in site cleanup often would exacerbate already serious
problems. 125 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in J.V Peters & Co., Inc v.
Administrator,E.P.A., 126 also held that the "allowance of a cause of action
prior to a response action would debilitate the central function of [CERCLA]." 127 Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett,128 stated that "pre-enforcement
review of EPA's remedial actions... [is] contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA." 129
The Senate Committee report influenced the Third Circuit's Lone
Pine130 decision and the Sixth Circuit's J.V Peters & Co., Inc.131 decision.
Both cases cited the committee report in refusing to overturn lower court
decisions denying pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA Superfund
actions. 132 The report also may have influenced the Second Circuit in Wagner Seed Co.133 The Second Circuit did not cite the committee report, but
did cite the Lone Pineand J.V Petersappellate decisions in refusing to overturn a district court decision134that the court lacked jurisdiction to review a
pre-enforcement challenge.
While not specifically mentioning other statutes, the Senate Committee report supports the Third Circuit's interpretation in Boarhead that
the intent of §113(h) was to bar all pre-enforcement challenges to cleanup
actions, whether brought under CERCLA or under the terms of another
statute. Cleanups are to be unimpeded by prior judicial review. 135 The
Committee report stated that the amendment confirmed that judicial
to the administrative record, unless
review of a response action is limited136
major deficiencies exist in the record.
The juxtaposition of the language supporting expeditious cleanups with the language stating the proposed §113 would limit judicial
review to the administrative record after completion of the cleanup supports the interpretation that the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee did not view challenges to cleanups brought under other statutes any more favorably than challenges brought under CERCLA. The
"review on the basis of administrative record" demonstrates that the Senate committee contemplated that the APA would come into play in
125. Id.at 887 (quoting S. Rep. No. 848,96th Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1980)).
126. 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985).
127. Id. at 264.
128. 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 315 (quoting Wheaton Industries v. E.P.A. 781 F.2d 354,356 (3d Cir. 1986)).
130. 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985).
131. 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985).
132. 777 F2d at 887 n. 3; 767 F2d at 265.
133. 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
134. Id. at 314-15. The court also cited Wheaton Industries v. E. P.A., 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.
1986), in which the Third Circuit followed its earlier Lone Pine decision.
135. S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., supra note 116, at 58.
136. Id. at 57.
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cleanup reviews, but not until completion of the cleanup. The same
should hold true for other statutes.
SARA was enacted in the second session of the 99th Congress.
The Environment and Public Works Committee Report was issued during
the first session. Floor commentary in the Senate when it passed the Conference Committee version of SARA shows similar support for the position that §113(h) precluded pre-cleanup judicial review. Sen. Simpson (RWyo.), a floor manager for the bill, 137 and Sen. Thurmond (R-S.C.), chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 138 in a colloquy, indicated that §113(h)
was intended to limit all challenges to the response actions of the EPA or
in §113(h), no matter what
any other party to the opportunities set forth 139
authority provided the basis for the challenge.
One senator held a slightly different view of §113(h). In his
remarks, Sen. Stafford (R-Vt.), then chairman of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, said that the section was not applicable to
all suits.140 He specifically cited the Conference Report, which said suits
under state nuisance law with respect to releases of hazardous substances
were not within the general prohibition contained in §113(h).' 41 In later
remarks, Sen. Stafford said that §113 governs only suits "brought under"
or "arising under" CERCLA and that there was no support for the proposition that any controversy over a response action could be heard only in
federal court and only under the provisions of §113.142 The senator did not
define the terms "brought under" or "arising under"; however, an argument can be made that he meant that a challenge to a cleanup could be
brought under another statute.
While Sen. Stafford's statements could be used to support an
argument that §113(h) did not prohibit a challenge to a cleanup that arose
under another law, the balance of his remarks lend little support to this
interpretation. The rest of his remarks on October 17, 1986, focus on the
preservation of other federal and state laws that establish cleanup standards and the necessity of the selection of a response that is a cost-effec137. Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9083, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3440.
138. Sen. Thurmond was also a manager of the bill, although not so designated for §113(h).
Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9083, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3440.
139. 132 Cong. Rec. S14,929 (daily ed. Oct. 3,1986). Sen. Thurmond inquired of Sen. Simpson whether §113(h) was to be comprehensive, covering "all lawsuits, under any authority,
concerning the response actions that are performed by EPA and other Federal agencies, by
States... and by private parties .... " He further inquired whether that section covered "all
issues that could be construed as a challenge to the response, and limits those challenges to
the opportunities specifically set forth in the section." Sen. Simpson stated that Sen. Thurmond's interpretation of the provision was correct. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sen. Thurmond would have been influential in drafting any section of the bill
affecting the right to judicial review.
140. Id. at S14,899.
141. Id. at S14,899. See Conference Report, supra note 39, at H9096, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.1
C.A.N. at 3317.
142. 132 Cong. Rec. S17,136-37 (daily ed. Oct. 17,1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
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tive, permanent solution to a human health or environmental threat. 143 In
his remarks on October 3, 1986, Sen. Stafford said that citizens' right to
challenge cleanup actions must be maintained to prevent actions in violation of the law and the waste of large amounts of money on what might be
an illegal action. 144 However, the senator said the courts must distinguish
between legitimate citizens' suits regarding irreparable injury that could
be addressed only if heard before or during a response action and14those of
potentially responsible parties designed to slow cleanup actions. 5
Sen. Stafford was concerned that "citizens asserting a true public
health or environmental interest in the response cannot obtain adequate
relief if an inadequate cleanup is allowed toproceed and... create a nuisance or a violation of this or other laws." 146 In this sense, Sen. Stafford's
comments lend support to the view expressed by Sens. Thurmond and
Stafford and the Environment and Public Works Committee report that
cleanups under CERCLA are to be carried out expeditiously.
Legislative History in the House of Representatives
The legislative history in the House of Representatives offers similar support for the Boarhead decision. Prior to passage of SARA, the position of the EPA was that the unique statutory provisions of CERCLA and
the actions required to respond to hazardous substance spills were such
that strict compliance with the provisions of other environmental statutes
was often inappropriate or unnecessary.14 7 The House report on SARA
stated that the section that became §113(h) codified the position of the EPA
and the Department of Justice's positions that "there is no right of judicial
review of the Administrator's selection and implementation of response
actions until after the response action [sic] have been completed to their
completion." 1 48 When judicial review does occur, it is limited to the
administrative record. 149 The lanrage of the House report parallels that
of the Senate committee report. ' Again, the language supports the conclusion that the House intended 'that challenges to cleanup actions,
whether brought under CERCLA or other statutes, are not to be heard
until after the cleanup is completed. The only exceptions to this prohibition are those specifically created by §113(h). 51
143. Id. at S17,138.
144. 132 Cong. Rec. S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
145. Id.
146. Id,
147. H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 132 (1986) (statement of Lee M. Thomas, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835,2914.
148. H. Rep. No. 253,99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 81 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2863.
149. Id.
150. S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., supra note 116, at 57-58.
151. 42 U.S.C. §9613(h).
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Floor commentary on SARA in the House confirms this interpretation. Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) was the House member of the conference committee responsible for defending the Housejposition on judicial
issues, including citizens' suits and judicial review.1l 2 In his floor statement, Rep. Glickman said §113(h) "covers all lawsuits, under any author153
ity, concerning the response actions that are performed" by any party.
Judicial review, no matter what the issue, is limited to five exceptions set
forth in §113(h).154
Rep. Glickman said that while Sen. Stafford's remarks of October
3, 1986, concerning the value of pre-implementation judicial review were
valid, the Conference Committee decided that the need for expeditious
cleanups outweighed the value of pre-implementation review.15 5 State
nuisance law could be used by states or private citizens to bring actions to
compel cleanups where those laws did not conflict with CERCLA, but
"the conferees did not intend to allow any plaintiff, whether [it be] the
neighbor who is unhappy about the construction of a toxic waste incinerator.., or the potentially responsible party... to156
stop a cleanup by what
would undoubtedly be a prolonged legal battle."
Because the House version of §113(h) was largely the basis of the
final version adopted, Rep. Glickman's description of the intent of that
section has additional weight. Glickman's description reflects the understanding of the House in adopting the section. In addition, the House
Report on SARA supports his statement. As noted above, that report
states that the intention of §113(h) was to recognize the EPA and the
Department of Justice view that the intent of CERCLA as originally
passed was to prohibit judicial 157
review of cleanup-related actions until
after completion of the response.

CONCLUSION
While the Third Circuit does not detail the review of the legislative history it analyzed to come to its decision in Boarhead, that histor r
does support the court's decision. The Conference Committee report
does not explicitly state that the intent of §113(h) is to preempt judicial
review based on other statutes of CERCLA-mandated actions. Nevertheless, the statements in the Senate and House committee reports on their
152. 132 Cong. Rec. H9563 (daily ed. Oct. 8,1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell). Rep. Dingell
was chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the majority manager
of the bill on the House floor. Id. at 9562.
153. Id. at H9582.
154. Id.
155. Id. at H9582-83.
156. Id. at H9583.
157. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
158. Conference Report, supra note 39.
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versions of the language in §113(h) strongly support this interpretation.
The comments of the managers of the Conference Committee bill, notwithstanding the statements of Sen. Stafford, also support this interpretation.
Sen. Thurmond was the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the drafting of the bill, as well as a manager of the bill,
although not for the section in question. Rep. Dingell designated Rep.
Glickman to speak for the House on that section of the bill. Sen. Thurmond and Rep. Glickman made their statements during consideration of
SARA; these statements were not challenged by other managers of the bill,
who yielded their time to Sen. Thurmond and Rep. Glickman for the purpose of interpreting §113.159 Even Sen. Stafford's limited view of §113(h)
does not seem to go so far as to support requests for judicial review
designed to delay the timely implementation of necessary responses to
hazardous wastes. He warns the courts to distinguish between legitimate
citizens' suits intended to prevent inadequate cleanups and dilatory suits
by potentially responsible parties.
Because of the legislative history, challenges to CERCLA cleanup
actions may be doomed to failure. In most cases failure will be a desirable
result, given the purposes of CERCLA. The harm caused by delaying a
CERCLA response action while ensuring that the requirements of a statute such as the Preservation Act are met usually will far outweigh the benefits received.
However, because the challenge could be the result of a direct conflict between other important environmental protection statutes and CERCLA, Congress may consider amending CERCLA to address the issue in
advance of the problem. But proposing additional amendments to CERCLA may create more problems than are solved. The temptation to carve
out exceptions to CERCLA to further a particular position may well lead
to legislation that could make an already complex statute unworkable.
Efforts to weaken or strengthen particular portions of the statute to further
what ultimately is a less significant problem than toxic waste cleanups
could undermine public support for CERCLA as a whole. Congress
should carefully review any future amendments to CERCLA intended to
limit potential problems caused by the broad reach of §113(h) to ensure
that greater prblems are not being created by proposed amendments.
CHRIS SCHATZMAN

159. See supra notes 139,153 and accompanying text,

